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Microsoft 365 Conditional Access: The First Policies That Matter

Microsoft 365 Conditional Access: The First Policies That Matter

Here’s the short version: Microsoft 365 Conditional Access is the rulebook for sign-in, and a small firm should turn on four policies before it invents a fifth. Require MFA for users, require MFA for admins, require MFA for Azure management, and block legacy authentication. Everything else is a second project.

This is the missing how-to next to our Microsoft 365 security checklist. The checklist names Conditional Access. This page is the order to build it without locking the office out on a Monday. If you only have time for one identity change this quarter, make it this one, after break-glass accounts exist.

What Microsoft 365 Conditional Access actually decides

Microsoft describes Conditional Access as if-then statements. If a user wants Microsoft 365, then they must complete an action, usually MFA. The Conditional Access overview is the policy engine. Signals come in. A decision goes out. The user either gets in, gets a prompt, or gets stopped.

The signals a small tenant can use on day one are simple: who the user is, which app they opened, whether the client is legacy authentication, and sometimes the country of the IP address. Device compliance is a real signal only after laptops are enrolled. Sign-in risk is a real signal only if you pay for Entra ID P2. Pretending you have those signals when you do not is how a policy says “block” and then blocks nobody, or blocks everyone.

A few limits matter more than the marketing diagram.

  • Policies run after the first factor succeeds. Conditional Access is not a firewall and it is not a defense against a flood of password guesses. Microsoft says so in that same overview.
  • If two policies apply, the user must satisfy both. MFA plus a compliant device means both, not whichever is easier.

A man signing in on a laptop beside an office window
Conditional Access evaluates the sign-in after the first factor succeeds

Security Defaults or Conditional Access, not both

Security Defaults are Microsoft’s free baseline. They make users register for MFA, they push MFA on admin roles, they block legacy authentication, and they block device code flow. Microsoft’s own number on that page is that MFA plus blocking legacy authentication stops more than 99.9 percent of the common identity attacks they measured. For a brand-new tenant with no premium licenses, leave Security Defaults on. Turning them off to “do it yourself” with no policies is a downgrade.

Business Premium is different. That license includes Entra ID P1, which is the license Conditional Access requires. Microsoft’s comparison table on the Security Defaults page says the free baseline has no customization, and Conditional Access does. The same page tells you the move: organizations that replace Security Defaults with Conditional Access must disable Security Defaults.

Do not disable them on Friday and “write policies next week.” Microsoft ships managed policies for that exact handoff: block legacy authentication, require MFA for Azure management, require MFA for admins, and require MFA for all users. Turn those on, then turn Security Defaults off, in one session, with a second admin already signed in.

QuestionStay on Security DefaultsMove to Conditional Access
LicenseNo Entra ID P1Business Premium or Entra ID P1
Need an exceptionYou do notA copier, a conference phone, or a staged rollout
Who decides MFAMicrosoft, when it feels necessary for usersYou, on every cloud app
Device rulesNoYes, after Intune is real
Risk of a gapLow, if you leave them onHigh, if you disable first and build later

Business Premium versus E3 is the license argument. This page assumes you already pay for P1 and have not used it.

The first policies worth turning on

Microsoft groups the starter set under Conditional Access templates. You do not need all of them in week one. You need the ones that match attacks we already see in small tenants.

Require MFA for all users

Per-user MFA, the old portal with Enabled and Enforced, is the version people screenshot and then forget. Conditional Access MFA covers cloud apps in one policy. Users whose MFA status page says Disabled are often fine. Microsoft says Disabled is the expected status when MFA comes from Security Defaults or Conditional Access, not from that legacy per-user switch.

Scope the policy at all users and all cloud apps. Exclude the two break-glass accounts. Do not exclude “VIP” mailboxes. The managing partner’s mailbox is the one a wire fraud wants.

Require MFA for admins, and for Azure management

Admin roles can change the tenant. Azure management can change the subscription. Microsoft lists both as baseline templates, separate from MFA for ordinary users. A Global Admin who only gets prompted “when necessary” is under-protected. Require MFA every time those roles touch an admin portal or Azure management. Pair that with Global Admin hygiene: the daily mailbox should not be the admin account that this policy is protecting.

Block legacy authentication

Legacy protocols do not do MFA. Microsoft’s block legacy authentication guidance says more than 97 percent of credential stuffing and more than 99 percent of password spray that they analyzed used legacy authentication. A tenant with a pretty MFA policy and SMTP AUTH still open has a side door.

Build this policy in report-only first. The things that break are boring and real: a scan-to-email copier, an old phone, a line-of-business app that still sends mail as a user. Our legacy authentication guide is the longer version of that cleanup. The Conditional Access policy is the control. The cleanup is how you avoid a dark copier.

Skip these in the first week:

  • Sign-in risk and user risk. Those need Entra ID P2. Business Premium does not include P2. A risk policy you cannot license is a checkbox that does nothing.
  • Require a compliant device for all apps. That is correct later, and it locks out every laptop that is not in Intune today. Enroll first. See Microsoft Intune for small business.
  • Block entire countries. Useful for a firm that never travels. Painful for a lawyer who opens mail from a courthouse Wi-Fi in another state, or a partner on a trip. Add it when you can name the exceptions.

Report-only before you enforce

Report-only is the policy running without the punishment. Sign-in logs show who would have been blocked or prompted. Microsoft’s legacy-auth instructions tell you to start there, then switch the policy to On when the impact is understood.

A useful report-only window for a 20 to 80 person firm is two weeks if the business is quiet, and a full billing or court cycle if it is not. You are looking for three lines in the log:

  1. Legacy authentication that is still a person on an old phone. They need a modern app, not an exception.
  2. Legacy authentication that is a device. It needs a scoped account, a kill date, and a name. Not “exclude all users.”
  3. MFA failures concentrated on one department. That is a registration problem. Send them to https://aka.ms/mfasetup or the Security info page before you enforce, not after the phones start ringing.

The What If tool in the Conditional Access blade answers “what would this policy do to this user” without waiting for them to sign in. Use it on the owner, on a break-glass account, and on the copier account before you flip On.

Two colleagues reviewing a laptop and a printed checklist
Two people should be signed in before Security Defaults come off

Break-glass and the exclusions that lock a tenant

Microsoft’s Security Defaults article tells you to keep two cloud-only emergency Global Admin accounts for the day normal admin cannot sign in. The setup steps live in Microsoft’s emergency access account guidance. Our break-glass page is the version we actually run: no mailbox, phishing-resistant sign-in, alert on every use, tested.

Exclude those two accounts from the policies that could lock you out. Do not exclude them from logging. An excluded account that also skips audit is a ghost admin.

Exclusions we refuse in a normal rollout:

  • The founder’s daily user, because “they travel.” Travel is a reason for a named trusted location or a temporary group, not a permanent hole on the owner.
  • A shared mailbox. Shared mailboxes should not sign in interactively. If something is signing in as info@, that is the finding, not an exclusion.
  • Everyone in Accounting, because the first week was noisy. Fix registration. Shrinking the policy to “IT only” means the firm is unprotected where the money sits.
  • Your IT provider’s daily admin. If we need in, we use a named account that satisfies the same MFA policy. A standing exclusion for the MSP is how the next provider inherits a back door.

One more lockout we have watched: someone turns on “require compliant device” and “require phishing-resistant MFA” for all admins in the same afternoon, and the only security key is at home. Passkeys belong on admin accounts. They belong there after a second method and a break-glass key already work.

What Conditional Access does not fix

Conditional Access makes a stolen password less useful. It does not make a messy tenant safe.

It does not clean SharePoint. If a user can open a file, Copilot can summarize it for them, MFA or not. It does not stop a mailbox rule that forwards mail to an outside address after the attacker has already satisfied MFA once. It does not restore a deleted library. Backup is still a separate control. It does not publish DMARC. It does not remove local admin rights from a laptop.

Token theft still exists. A session stolen after MFA can ride until you revoke sessions and shorten how long a sign-in lives. Compliant devices and phishing-resistant methods shrink that window. They are the second project, after the four baseline policies are actually On.

CISA’s plain instruction is still the right one for the human side of this: use more than a password. Their multifactor authentication guidance is written for people who are not identity engineers. Conditional Access is how a Microsoft 365 tenant makes that instruction stick.

A rollout order for a 20 to 80 person firm

  1. Confirm the license. Business Premium or another Entra ID P1 source. If you are on Business Basic, stay on Security Defaults until the license changes.
  2. Create and test two break-glass accounts. Confirm an alert fires. Write down where the keys are.
  3. Export a week or two of sign-in logs. Filter client app to legacy protocols. Name every hit.
  4. Create the four policies. MFA for all users, MFA for admins, MFA for Azure management, block legacy authentication. Block-legacy stays report-only.
  5. Register MFA for anyone the report says will be prompted and is not registered. Authenticator, not SMS, for anyone who can move money.
  6. In one session: turn the MFA policies On, turn Security Defaults Off, keep a second admin signed in. Watch the help desk for a day.
  7. After the legacy report is boring, turn block-legacy On. Give the copier a scoped path with an end date, or replace it.
  8. A month later, talk about compliant devices for finance and legal, and phishing-resistant MFA for admins. Not before.

A brokerage-shaped version of this, where the risk was locking working agents out of the tools they sell with, is Conditional Access without locking agents out. Copy the sequence even if your firm is a law office or a clinic. Report-only, then enforce, then tighten.

How you know it is actually on

Open Entra, Conditional Access, Policies. You want to see the four policies in state On, not Report-only and not Off. Security Defaults should read Disabled. A test user in a private browser should get an MFA prompt for Outlook on the web. A break-glass account should get in without being trapped by the same policy, and that sign-in should have paged someone.

If your provider cannot show you those four policies, you do not have Conditional Access. You have a license. Cybersecurity work for a Microsoft tenant starts here, then moves to sharing, backup, and the devices. The policy blade is the proof, not a sentence in a proposal.

Contact Secure Techies if you want that session run against the tenant you already pay for. We will say if Security Defaults should stay, and we will not turn them off until the replacement policies are ready the same day.

Frequently Asked Questions

Microsoft 365 Conditional Access is the Entra ID policy engine that decides what a sign-in must do after the password or primary login succeeds. A policy is an if-then rule: if this user opens this app from this kind of device, then require MFA, a compliant device, or a block. It is included with Entra ID P1, which Microsoft 365 Business Premium already carries.
No. Microsoft requires you to turn Security Defaults off when you replace them with Conditional Access. Do that on the same day you turn on the replacement policies. Leaving a gap means the tenant has neither the free baseline nor your new rules.
Start with the four Microsoft already packages for the move off Security Defaults: block legacy authentication, require MFA for admins, require MFA for Azure management, and require MFA for all users. Put block-legacy in report-only until sign-in logs show what will break. Leave sign-in risk policies alone unless you actually have Entra ID P2.
Two cloud-only emergency access accounts, and almost nobody else. Exclude them from the policies that could lock the tenant, not from audit. Do not exclude the owner’s daily mailbox, a shared scanner login, or your MSP’s everyday admin account. Those exclusions become the hole.
No. MFA is one grant control inside a policy. Conditional Access is how you require that control, for which apps, and with which exceptions. A tenant can have MFA methods registered and still skip them if no policy asks. Passkeys and compliant devices are stricter grant controls, not a different product.
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