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Cybersecurity

Remove Local Admin Rights, Then Keep One Managed Account

Remove Local Admin Rights, Then Keep One Managed Account

Here’s the short version: remove local admin rights means the account people use all day is not in the local Administrators group. Keep one local administrator account on each Windows PC, let Windows LAPS rotate that password, and let a short list of people read it when a task actually needs elevation.

A bookkeeper who can install anything is also a bookkeeper whose browser can install anything. That is the failure we see on small-firm laptops. The fix is two steps, and firms usually do only one of them.

What remove local admin rights actually means

The National Cyber Security Centre’s guide for small organisations says most PCs arrive with one main account, and that account is an administrator. If that is the account in use when an attack lands, the attacker can take the device. Create a standard user for day-to-day work, and keep administrator access for the moments that need it.

On a firm PC already in Microsoft 365, the daily account is the person’s Entra account. Remove it from the local Administrators group. Leave a separate local administrator account, and do not put the person’s name on it. They sign in as themselves for mail, the browser, and Word. When a driver or a line-of-business installer needs elevation, someone allowed to do that types the local administrator password for that one PC.

This is a different control from a Microsoft 365 Global Admin. A Global Admin can reset a user and read the tenant. A local administrator can change that one Windows device. Removing the cloud role and leaving the laptop administrator in place does not finish the job.

A shared local password is how one laptop becomes many

Microsoft’s Windows LAPS overview names the failure. Local administrator accounts often share one password across many devices, and that password is how an attacker moves sideways. One compromised laptop becomes every other laptop built with the same local password.

The NCSC’s guidance on preventing lateral movement says administrators should use a normal account for normal work and a separate account for administrator work.

A person working across several computers at one desk
Several machines do not need one shared local administrator password.

Windows LAPS rotates each device’s local administrator password, stores it, and lets an authorized administrator retrieve it. It can also manage the Directory Services Restore Mode password on a domain controller. Skip that on a laptop project. DSRM backup requires Active Directory password encryption, and that encryption requires a domain at the 2016 functional level or later.

Windows LAPS is the product name to use now

Windows LAPS is built into Windows. It shipped in the updates released on April 11, 2023. It is on Windows 11 23H2 and later, and on other supported clients and servers that received that April 2023 update or a later one, including Windows 10, Windows 11 21H2 and 22H2, Windows Server 2019, and Windows Server 2022. Windows 10 left support on October 14, 2025. Windows LAPS stays available only on Windows 10 devices that still receive updates, such as Extended Security Updates. New deployments belong on Windows 11 or a supported Windows Server.

The feature costs nothing extra on those platforms. Active Directory backup has no added license. Entra backup requires Microsoft Entra ID Free or higher. Intune, Conditional Access, custom roles, and administrative units have their own licenses. LAPS is not a product you buy on top of Windows.

Legacy Microsoft LAPS is the 2016 installer

The older tool is legacy Microsoft LAPS, published on the Download Center in 2016. Microsoft deprecated it as of Windows 11 23H2 and later. Newer Windows versions block the installer, and Microsoft no longer considers code changes for it. Support on older Windows lasts only until those versions leave support.

Windows LAPS does not need that installer. Microsoft’s migration article says the long-term move is off the legacy product. Side by side is supported only when the two tools manage different local accounts. The Windows LAPS FAQ says the same about a third-party password tool: different accounts, or Windows LAPS rejects the other product’s attempt to change the password it manages.

Emulation mode lets the built-in feature honor the old Group Policy during a transition. If the legacy client-side extension is still installed, Windows LAPS defers to it and turns emulation off. If a device has both a native setting and a legacy setting, the native setting wins. Policy roots do not merge. Microsoft’s policy settings page says the first root that contains any explicit setting becomes the active policy, and blank settings on that root fall back to defaults.

The account has to exist, and it has to be enabled

If you do not name an account, Windows LAPS manages the built-in local Administrator, which it finds by the well-known relative identifier, not by the word “Administrator.” That matters because someone may have renamed the account. The rename does not hide it from LAPS.

If you name a custom account, Windows LAPS does not create it, unless you turn on automatic account management. That automatic mode exists only on Windows 11 version 24H2, Windows Server 2025, and later, and it defaults to off. When it is on, the account-name setting is ignored and the policy decides whether to manage the built-in Administrator or a new custom account. On Windows 10 and on Windows 11 before 24H2, you create the custom account yourself before the policy can rotate it.

A disabled Administrator account still gets a password

Windows LAPS manages the password whether the account is enabled or disabled. A disabled account cannot be used until someone enables it. A hardening script that disables the built-in Administrator, with no replacement account, leaves a password rotating into Entra and a help desk that still cannot sign in. Enable the account you intend to use, or create the custom account and name it, before you call the project done.

Password length defaults to 14 characters, in a range of 8 to 64. Password age defaults to 30 days. The minimum is 1 day for Active Directory and 7 days for Entra. The maximum is 365 days. Complexity defaults to Microsoft’s setting 4: large letters, small letters, numbers, and special characters. If that password fights the PC’s own local password policy, LAPS fails and logs event 10027. Changing the age does not rotate the current password and does not move its expiration.

After the password is used, the default post-authentication action resets it and signs the managed account out, following a 24-hour grace period. A delay of 0 turns those actions off. Microsoft says someone who already has administrative control with a valid LAPS password can try to block them. Do not paste the password into a ticket that lives for a year.

Pick one directory, then turn backup on

Join state decides the directory, and you only get one.

  • A device joined only to Microsoft Entra ID can back up only to Entra.
  • A device joined only to Active Directory can back up only to Active Directory.
  • A hybrid-joined device can back up to either directory, not to both.
  • A workplace-joined device, where the user added a work account and the PC itself was never joined, is not supported.
  • Microsoft Entra Domain Services does not support Windows LAPS.
  • Non-Windows devices are out of scope. A Mac on the same bench needs a different control.

The backup setting defaults to disabled. A Windows 11 PC can have the feature and still store nothing until a policy sets the directory to Entra or to Active Directory. For Entra, also set Enable Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) to Yes under Entra ID, Devices, Device settings. The FAQ says that missed switch is the common error. Entra-only backup does not need an Active Directory schema extension, and it does not need Entra Connect.

Passwords sent to Entra use HTTPS in transit and AES-256 at rest. Active Directory encryption is a separate option, and it is what unlocks password history. History defaults to zero previous passwords and can be raised to 12, only with that encryption on. Entra does not keep that history.

Name who can read the password

Reading the password in Entra requires the permission microsoft.directory/deviceLocalCredentials/password/read. Microsoft’s Entra article on Windows LAPS says the built-in roles Cloud Device Administrator and Intune Administrator are granted the broader device.LocalCredentials.Read.All permission. You can also create a custom role with the password-read permission, or put devices in an administrative unit and assign Cloud Device Administrator only on that unit.

That list should be short. Two people who actually rebuild PCs is a normal small-firm answer. Every manager is not. A Global Admin is the wrong role to hand out so someone can see a laptop password. The same Entra article says you can put Conditional Access on the directory roles that are allowed to recover the password. If you already have Conditional Access for admins, the password-recovery role belongs in that set.

Audit the retrieval. Entra records password update and recovery. When a technician who could read these passwords leaves, rotate the devices they could have opened. Do not wait for the 30-day age. Intune can rotate a password on demand. A change to the age setting will not. The same departure belongs on the employee offboarding checklist.

Intune helps, and it is not a prerequisite

The FAQ is plain: you do not need Intune to use Windows LAPS in Active Directory mode or in Entra mode. Intune is how you deploy the policy at scale, watch it, and reset a password outside the schedule. Microsoft Intune for a small business is a separate decision. If you do use Intune, its Windows LAPS policy is the CSP, and that CSP overrides Group Policy and legacy LAPS. A half-written Intune profile becomes the whole policy. The blanks fill in with defaults, including a backup directory that is still disabled if you never set it.

Apps will ask, and that is a list, not a rollback

Two people working on separate laptops
Each person signs in as themselves for ordinary work.

The afternoon you remove local admin rights, something will ask for a password. A tax application, a label printer, a VPN client, an old scanner. Write those down the week before, on one PC, with someone who can elevate in the room. Install for the user, deploy from Intune, or replace the tool. The ones that truly need an administrator get the LAPS password once, and the user goes back to the standard account.

Putting the office back into Administrators because one application complained is how the project dies. A standard user can still work. They cannot silently install whatever a phishing page just offered. BitLocker encrypts the disk. It does not decide who is an administrator. The same question applies to the backup server: a local password shared with the file server is a path into the copies. The storage side is immutable backups. The account side is this page.

What we change on a small firm’s PCs

On a Windows estate we will do these in order:

  1. List who is in the local Administrators group on a sample of PCs, including the owner and the front desk.
  2. Confirm the PCs are Entra-joined or domain-joined. Workplace-joined laptops get joined properly, or they stay outside LAPS and we say so.
  3. Create or enable the one local administrator account LAPS will manage. On Windows 11 24H2 or Server 2025, automatic account management can do the create. On older supported Windows, we create a custom account ourselves.
  4. Turn on the Entra LAPS switch if the passwords will live in Entra, and set the backup directory in policy. Until that directory is set, the default is that nothing is backed up.
  5. Remove daily users from Administrators after the password is retrievable by the two people who should have it.
  6. Keep a list of the applications that still need elevation, and stop adding people back to the group to silence a prompt.

We will not install the 2016 package on Windows 11, store one password in two directories, or leave a retrieved password in a ticket after the reset should have killed it.

If the local groups, the LAPS policy, and the short list of people who can read passwords should be one project, start with cybersecurity and contact Secure Techies. A shared administrator password is the problem that outlasts the prompt.

Frequently Asked Questions

No. The account they use for email and the browser should be a standard user. The NCSC tells small organisations to create that standard account and reserve administrator access for the moments that actually need it. A shared local administrator password on every PC is a separate problem, and it is the one Windows LAPS is built to close.
No. Windows LAPS rotates and stores the password of one local administrator account per device. It does not take people out of the Administrators group. You still remove those daily accounts yourself. If you skip that step, staff remain local administrators and LAPS is only rotating a password they do not need.
No. Microsoft says you can run Windows LAPS with Active Directory or with Microsoft Entra ID without Intune. Intune is the practical way to push the policy, see which devices succeeded, and rotate a password on demand. The feature itself is included on supported Windows. Entra ID Free is enough to store the password in the cloud.
No. That 2016 installer is legacy Microsoft LAPS. Microsoft deprecated it as of Windows 11 23H2 and later, and newer Windows versions block the installer. Windows LAPS is built into supported Windows. You do not install the old package to get it. If both products are aimed at the same local account, that configuration is not supported.
No. Entra-joined devices back up only to Entra. Domain-joined devices back up only to Active Directory. A hybrid-joined device can use one directory or the other, not both. Workplace-joined PCs, the ones where someone only added a work account, are not supported. Entra Domain Services does not support Windows LAPS either.
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